Ninth Circuit Review—Pendent Party Jurisdiction—Forcing the Subtle and Complex Issue by Osen, Frank S.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1978
Ninth Circuit Review—Pendent Party
Jurisdiction—Forcing the Subtle and Complex
Issue
Frank S. Osen
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank S. Osen, Ninth Circuit Review—Pendent Party Jurisdiction—Forcing the Subtle and Complex Issue, 11 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 659 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol11/iss3/8
PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION-FORCING
THE "SUBTLE AND COMPLEX ISSUE"
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction' may be invoked to join
"pendent parties" 2 has been the subject of a great deal of conflict and
confusion in recent years. The Ninth Circuit has consistently taken the
minority view that there must be an independent basis of federal juris-
diction for each party before the court. Other circuits disagree, and
Supreme Court decisions have done more to confuse the issue than to
resolve it.
In Ayala v. United States,' the Ninth Circuit has attacked the very
foundation of pendent party jurisdiction, holding that such jurisdiction is
beyond the scope of power granted to the federal courts under article I
of the Constitution. 4 In reviewing this decision, the Supreme Court may
be forced to confront the basic nature of pendent jurisdiction in a way it
has not done since the landmark opinion of United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs .5
HI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PENDENT JURISDICTION
Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, their adjudica-
tion of particular claims must, theoretically, be predicated upon a grant
of judicial power governing those claims. The doctrine of pendent juris-
diction, however, allows federal courts certain limited authority to ad-
judicate nonfederal claims. This concept may be traced to the 1824 case
1. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 921-26 (2d ed. 1973); C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS]; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3567 (1973); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary
Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of the Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263 (1975).
2. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 1, at § 19; Fortune, Pendent
Jurisdiction-The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Fortune]; Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 657 (1968); Note, Federal Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 194 (1976).
3. 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 50 (1977).
4. Id. at 1199-1200. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides in pertinent part: "The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority" ....
5. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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of Osborn v. Bank of United States.6 In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall
held that the Constitution's grant of power to the federal judiciary
included the power to decide subsidiary questions of state law, where
necessary to resolve a federal claim before the circuit courts.
7
In 1909 the Supreme Court extended this proposition in Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad8 to permit resolution of a state claim
which rendered review of a constitutional issue unnecessary. 9 The Court
reasoned in Siler that, as a general proposition, jurisdiction to decide a
federal claim necessarily empowers the federal court to decide all other
questions in the case.l1
Twenty-four years later, in Hum v. Oursler,1' the Court formulated a
"cause of action" test to assess federal jurisdiction over questions of
state law: federal courts could exercise pendent jurisdiction where the
federal and state claims involved could be said to constitute "two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action."I 2 By failing to adequate-
ly define the scope of a "cause of action," 13 however, the Hum standard
generated considerable confusion and resulted in the adoption of several
conflicting standards among the lower federal courts. 
14
In 1966 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this confusion. In
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,15 the Court replaced the "unnecessarily
grudging" 16 single cause of action test with a doctrine recognizing broad
federal power over pendent state claims:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a [federal] claim. . . and the relationship between that claim
6. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
7. Id. at 822-23.
8. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
9. Id. at 191-93. In Siler a state provision which regulated rules affecting railroad rates
was attacked as both unauthorized under state law and as unconstitutional. Id. at 190-91.
10. Id. at 191.
II. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Hum involved joinder of a state claim of unfair competition
with a federal claim of copyright infringement.
12. Id. at 246.
13. "A 'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and something different
for another." Id. at 247 (quoting United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62,
67-68 (1933)).
14. Compare Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Clark, J., dissenting) ("[R]equiring [complete] identity of facts, practically excludes the
possibility of a single cause [of action].") with United Lens Corp. v. Doray Lamp Co., 93
F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1937) (accepting jurisdiction, though noting, "Keeping in mind that
'a cause of action does not consist of facts but the violation of a right which the facts
show,' we find plaintiff skating on ice that is rather thin.").
15. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In Gibbs plaintiff sought to join claims of unlawful union
practices under § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970),
with state claims for tortious interference with contract. 383 U.S. at 720.
16. 383 U.S. at 725.
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and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional "case." . . . The
state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or
state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assum-
ing substantiality of the federal issues, there is power to hear the
whole.
17
The Court noted, however, that pendent jurisdiction was "a doctrine
of discretion, not of plaintiff's right" 18 and premised its application upon
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants. " 1
9
III. THE EXTENSION TO PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION
Gibbs involved the joinder of claims between parties already properly
before the federal court.20 The pendent party variant of pendent juris-
diction arises when one or more parties to the pendent state claim are not
involved in the federal claim. In such a case there is no independent basis
of federal jurisdiction over the pendent parties. They are only in federal
court by virtue of their participation in events which generate a federal
claim between other parties.2' Pendent party claims may arise in conjunc-
tion with either diversity or federal question claims under any of several
federal jurisdiction-conferring statutes,22 and may entail the joinder of
either an additional plaintiff or an additional defendant.
Although a few anomalous pre-Gibbs decisions permitted pendent
party claims,23 it appears that joinder of a plaintiff's nonfederal claim
against the defendant, or joinder of a pendent claim against an additional
defendant, was outside the parameters of the Hum test. 24 Gibbs, how-
17. Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 726 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. Dismissal is available at any point in the action and should be utilized when (1)
the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, (2) the court ascertains that state issues
predominate, or (3) the conflicting state and federal remedies are likely to confuse a jury.
Id. at 726-27.
20. Id. at 720.
21. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
22. See, e.g., cases cited note 27 infra.
23. See Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 1964); Morris v. Gimbel
Bros., 246 F. Supp. 984, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1965). Note that these decisions were based upon
the exigencies of Pennsylvania law, which compelled joinder of claims in certain situa-
tions.
24. A pendent party claim would have constituted a separate cause of action under the
Hum test. See, e.g., Desert Beach Corp. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 581,585-86 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
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ever, permitted the conclusion that federal judicial power exists whenev-
er pendent claims arise from common "operative facts," and, while the
facts in Gibbs did not involve the joinder of a pendent party, nothing in
the Court's reasoning suggests that pendent party claims require a more
restrictive analysis than other pendent claims. The opinion, in fact, noted
that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "joinder of claims,
parties and remedies is strongly encouraged."25
Several courts and commentators have interpreted these factors in the
Gibbs opinion to constitute a sub silentio endorsement of pendent party
theory. 26 To date, eight circuits have applied the Gibbs rationale to the
joinder of pendent parties.27 Only the Seventh Circuit, relying on pre-
Gibbs precedent, has joined the Ninth Circuit in consistently denying
25. 383 U.S. at 724 (emphasis added).
26. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809 (2d Cir. 1971);
Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 816 (8th Cir. 1969); Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968); Fortune, supra note 2, at 12,
27. First Circuit: Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48 (1st Cir. 1975) (breach of
fiduciary duty on contract pendent to federal claim).
Second Circuit: Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 996 (2d Cir. 1973) (pendent party
jurisdiction not automatically lost when federal question anchor claim dismissed); Alme-
nares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1084 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972)
(federal statutory claim lacking amount in controversy pendent to constitutional claim);
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809 (2d Cir. 1971) (federal
admiralty claim and pendent state tort claim); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap,
Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1971) (state unfair competition claim pendent to copyright
claim).
Third Circuit: Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516,520 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
995 (1974) (prisoner's state law claim against fellow prisoners pendent to federal claim
against prison officials); Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 291 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971) (dicta)
(pendent party-plaintiffs' claims which lacked requisite amount in controversy could be
joined to federal diversity anchor claim); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149,
154 (3d Cir. 1968) (diversity claim lacking requisite amount in controversy pendent to
diversity anchor claim).
Fourth Circuit: Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1968) (diversity claim for less
than requisite amount joined with diversity anchor claim against another defendant).
Fifth Circuit: Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)
(state claim pendent to Federal Tort Claims suit).
Sixth Circuit: Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1970)
(diversity claim lacking requisite amount in controversy pendent to diversity anchor
claim); F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1970)
(diversity claim lacking requisite amount in controversy pendent to diversity anchor
claim).
Eighth Circuit: Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1973) (nonfed-
eral unfair competition claim pendent to federal infringement claim); Hatridge v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 816 (8th Cir. 1969) (diversity claim lacking requisite amount
in controversy pendent to diversity anchor claim).
Tenth Circuit: Niebuhr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 618, 621 (10th Cir.
1973) (diversity claim lacking requisite amount in controversy pendent to diversity anchor
claim).
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jurisdiction over pendent party claims in the context of both federal
question and diversity claims.
28
IV. PENDENT PARTY THEORY: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT
Hymer v. Chai,29 expressly reaffirmed in Ayala,3" marks the starting
point of the Ninth Circuit's campaign to limit Gibbs to the pendent claim
situation. 31 In Hymer, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the policies of
fairness and efficiency which animated Gibbs,32 but rejected a pendent
party claim on the authority of Kataoka v. May Department Stores
Company,33 a Ninth Circuit decision which predated Gibbs and was
decided under the more restrictive Hum "cause of action" test. 34 This
reliance on Kataoka has been criticized by commentators 35 and, indeed,
the blanket rejection of pendent party theory posited by Hymer has met
with resistance36 and even rejection 37 by district courts within the Ninth
Circuit itself. The Ninth Circuit's invocation of Hymer as mandating a
bar to pendent party jurisdiction in all circumstances may also be
criticized on the ground that Hymer presented one of the least compelling
cases for the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction. 38 ,
28. See Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 917 (1974) (citing Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965)).
29. 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
30. 550 F.2d at 1200.
31. "Joinder of claims, not joinder of parties, is the object of the [Gibbs] doctrine." 407
F.2d at 137.
32. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Pendent jurisdiction was devised to avoid the waste and inefficiency resulting from
fragmenting a single action and dividing the pieces into separate proceedings before
the state and federal courts and to encourage a party who had a claim presenting a
substantial federal question, mixed with a nonfederal claim, to take his bundle of
claims to the federal court.
Id. (footnote omitted).
33. 115 F. 2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940).
34. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
35. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the Jurisdiction-Confer-
ring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 164 (1973).
36. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Union Pac. R.R., 351 F. Supp. 392, 393 (C.D. Cal. 1972) ("I
believe also, that there is much merit in the reasoning in the opinion in Hipp v. United
States, 313 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), which invoked pendent jurisdiction under
comparable circumstances. However, I am obliged to conclude that the controlling deci-
sion in the Circuit is Hymer v. Chai. ").
37. Princess Cruises Corp. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 762, 765 (N.D.
Cal. 1974).
38. See Note, Federal Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-
Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 194, 230-31 (1976).
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In Moor v. Madigan," the Ninth Circuit again faced the issue of
pendent party jurisdiction. There, the petitioner sought to join state law
claims against a county with a related claim against local government
officials under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 40 The Ninth Circuit cited Hymer
for the proposition that the court lacked power to join a party against
whom no federal claim was asserted. 41 Nevertheless, the court proceeded
to discuss the discretionary concerns outlined by Gibbs and noted that the
facts in Moor did not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the
litigants.'"42 Thus, the court seemed to base its decision on a conclusion
that pendent jurisdiction was inappropriate in terms of judicial discretion
as well as federal power.43
On certiorari, the Supreme Court, reviewing sub nom. Moor v. County
of Alameda,44 upheld the Ninth Circuit's decision as a valid exercise of
the court's discretion to refuse pendent jurisdiction. 45 This holding neces-
sarily entailed an application of the Gibbs rationale to pendent party
jurisdiction, 46 which one commentator has referred to as a "flirtation
with the joinder of pendent parties. "47 Indeed, Justice Marshall's opinion
went a step further than Gibbs by expressly citing the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing third-party claims48 and compulsory counter-
claims49 as examples of situations in which parties may be brought into
federal court without an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over
them.50 Moor also impliedly disapproved Hymer, noting that: "Hymer
stands virtually alone against [the] post-Gibbs trend . . . and signifi-
cantly Hymer was largely based on . .. a decision which predated
39. 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693 (1973).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
41. 458 F.2d at 1221.
42. Id.
43. Id. "Thus, the district court also felt that as a purely discretionary matter the
federal court was an inappropriate forum to hear these state claims." Id. (footnote
omitted).
44. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
45. Id. at 716-17.
46. See id. at 712-16.
47. Sullivan, Pendent Jurisdiction: The Impact of Hagans and Moor, 7 IND. L. REV.
925, 944 (1974).
48. 411 U.S. at 714-15 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) and 13(h)).
49. 411 U.S. at 714-15 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)).
50. Among the cases cited by the Court on this point were: Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 608-09 (1926); Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir. 1966);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Eric Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843, 844 (3d Cir. 1962); Union
Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276 F.2d 468, 471 (9th Cir. 1960); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d
804, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1959).
[Vol. I11
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Gibbs and the expansion of the concept of pendent jurisdiction beyond
the narrow limits set by Hum v. Oursler ... "51
The Supreme Court opinion did note differences between the pendent
claim situation contemplated by Gibbs and the pendent party variant.52
The Court, however, declined to state in what manner these distinctions
affected application of the Gibbs rationale. It merely concluded:
"Whether there exists judicial power to hear the state law claims against
[the pendent party] is, in short, a subtle and complex question with far-
reaching implications. But we do not consider it appropriate to resolve
''53this difficult issue in the present case ... .
Thus Moor, though apparently questioning the application of the
Gibbs standard to pendent parties, avoided a ruling on the existence of
federal power under article I to allow pendent party claims. 54 The result
appears somewhat anomalous, inasmuch as the lengthy discussion of
discretionary dismissal implies the existence of power to accept juris-
diction. This ambiguous approach left much room for continuing dis-
agreement among the circuit courts.
The Ninth Circuit, dismissing Moor's unfavorable dicta concerning
Hymer,55 reaffirmed its position against pendent parties in Aldinger v.
Howard,56 a case which served as the vehicle for the Supreme Court's
most recent opinion in the area. The situation in Aldinger somewhat
resembled that in Moor: a civil rights claim against county officials 57 was
joined with a state law claim against the county.58 There was no diversity
as to the county, and the county was not a "person" amenable to suit
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, 59 the source of the federal claim.'
The Ninth Circuit opinion acknowledged that the court was "not
unaware of the widespread rejection of Hymer by other courts. In fact,
support for this court's position seems to have eroded since [its] holding
in Moor v. Madigan ."61 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected juris-
51. 411 U.S. at 713-14 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 712-13.
53. Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 713-14, discussed in Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (9th Cir.
1975), affl'd, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
56. 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
57. The claim was made under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970). Jurisdiction was invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
58. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.120 (1974).
59. The statute provides in pertinent part: "Every person who, under color of any
statute . . . of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
60. 513 F.2d at 1259. Plaintiff also relied upon 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). Id.
61. 513 F.2d at 1261 (footnote omitted).
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diction over the pendent party claim, citing the district court's view that,
under Ninth Circuit precedent, the court had "no power to hear claims
against 'pendent parties.' "62 The court further stated that it was "not
bound by any of the . . . dicta in Moor v. County of Alameda to
reconsider [its] decisions in Hymer v. Chai and Moor v. Madigan."63
In the course of its decision, the court also engaged in a statutory
analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, concluding that "this legislation
and Congress' failure to repeal it reflect a congressional disinclination to
see local governmental units subjected to actions in federal' courts
",64
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit on the basis
of this statutory interpretation. 65 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, 66 approached the issue of federal power only in terms of the juris-
diction conferred by Congress. 67 In Aldinger, as in Moor, the Court
side-stepped the more fundamental question of article III jurisdiction,
reasoning that "it would be. . . unnecessary to lay down any sweeping
pronouncement upon the existence or exercise of such jurisdiction. "68
The opinion also noted that "[blefore it can be concluded that [pendent
party] jurisdiction exists, a federal court must satisfy itself not only that
Art. I permits it, but that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction
has not expressly or by implication negated its existence.' '69
The majority thereupon held that since Congress had deliberately
excluded counties from liability under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, it could not have intended that counties be "brought back"
into the suit as pendent parties under the general jurisdictional statutes.70
As the dissent observed, this test may well prove difficult and overly
restrictive in application, "because all instances of asserted pendent-
party jurisdiction will by definition involve a party as to whom Congress
has impliedly 'addressed itself' by not expressly conferring subject-
matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. '"71
62. Id. at 1260 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 1260-61.
64. Id. at 1261.
65. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
66. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 19. Interestingly, as a
circuit court judge, Justice Blackmun had authored an opinion critical of Hymer. See
Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 817 (8th Cir. 1969).
67. 427 U.S. at 16-17. The extent to which article III jurisdiction is transmitted to the
federal courts has long been said to be within Congress' discretion. Id. at 17.
68. Id. at 18.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 17.
71. Id. at 23. See generally Comment, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pendent
(Vol. I1I
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Although Aldinger added a restrictive component to pendent party
analysis, the Supreme Court opinion contained the following dictum:
Other statutory grants and other alignments of parties and claims
might call for a different result. When the grant of jurisdiction to a
federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort
claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the argu-
ment of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the
additional argument that only in federal court may all of the claims
be tried together.
72
V. AYALA: CHALLENGING THE AMBIT OF ARTICLE III
The compelling case posed by the Supreme Court in Aldinger73 was
precisely the case presented to the Ninth Circuit in Ayala v. United
States .7  Multiple plaintiffs asserted consolidated claims against the
United States and Pullman, Incorporated in connection with the explo-
sion of several Pullman-manufactured boxcars which had been transport-
ing government bombs pursuant to a contract with the Department of the
Navy. 75 While all of the plaintiffs were able to assert federal claims
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act76 and 28
U.S.C. section 1346(b),77 several of those who sought to join Pullman as
an additional defendant were unable to meet either the diversity require-
ment78 or the amount in controversy requirement for federal subject
matter jurisdiction. 79 These plaintiffs attempted joinder under two
theories of pendent party jurisdiction. Principally, they sought to append
Pullman as an additional defendant to their Federal Tort Claims actions
against the United States. 80 In the alternative, they attempted to join
themselves, as pendent party-plaintiffs, to those federal court claims
Party Jurisdiction, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1357 (1977); Redish & Muench, Adjudication of
Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1976):
[E]ven where an examination of the legislative history reveals some discussion of the
jurisdictional issue, total reliance by the courts on their discernment of the actual
intent of Congress will not produce a sensible allocation of jurisdiction for federal
causes of action. . . . Moreover, even if purported expressions of majority opinion
could be identified, their reliability would be questionable ....
Id. at 328.
172. 427 U.S. at 18 (footnote omitted).
73. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
74. 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 50 (1977).
75. Id. at 1197.
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). The statute provides in pertinent part: "[T]he district
courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages ....
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
79. Id.
80. 550 F.2d at 1198.
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initiated against Pullman by parties who had fulfilled the diversity re-
quirements. 81 The district court ordered dismissal of plaintiffs' claims
against Pullman and they appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
82
In affirming the lower court's dismissal, the Ninth Circuit dealt rather
brusquely with the Supreme Court's suggestion in Aldinger that pendent
party claims brought in conjunction with claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act present an attractive setting for pendent party jurisdiction:83
We concluded in Aldinger that this court was not bound by Supreme
Court dictum in Moor . . . .Similarly, we conclude here that we
are not bound by new dictum in Aldinger which, in any event,
merely suggests that "[o]ther statutory grants and other alignments
of parties and claims might call for a different result.84
Indeed, the Ayala court appears to have treated the entire Aldinger
opinion as a nullity, noting that "[tihe Supreme Court's affirmance in
Aldinger, grounded as it was on a congressional disinclination to allow-
ing pendent party jurisdiction, may . . . be read merely as another
avoidance of the ultimate question of constitutional power left unan-
swered by the Court in Moor."
8 5
The plaintiff-appellants in Ayala urged the Ninth Circuit to re-ex-
amine its holding in Williams v. United States,86 an earlier case which
rejected a pendent party claim brought in conjunction with a Federal Tort
Claims Act anchor claim. 7 The court, however, refused to apply the
approach suggested by Aldinger, observing that "putting to one side the
potential statutory analysis underlying our decision in Williams, it is
clear that Hymer's rejection of pendent party theory was not based on a
ferreted congressional disinclination, but rather rested on a more funda-
mental constitutional consideration."
88
While Aldinger posited the statutory test as preceding an inquiry into
article III's applicability to pendent party claims, 89 and thereby avoided
examination of article III, Ayala reversed the sequence, holding that the
constitutional power hurdle precluded analysis of the jurisdiction-confer-
ring statute. 90 This process appears to have been designed to foreclose
any opportunity for the Supreme Court to affirm Ayala on alternate
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1197.
83. See 427 U.S. at 18.
84. 550 F.2d at 1200.
85. Id. (footnote omitted).
86. 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969).
87. 550 F.2d at 1199.
88. Id. at 1199-1200.
89. See 427 U.S. at 15-17.
90. See 550 F.2d at 1199-1200.
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grounds as it had done in Moor and Aldinger. The district court judge in
Ayala expressly ruled that, should the court of appeals determine pen-
dent party jurisdiction to be proper, he would exercise discretion in favor
of pendent party joinder. 91 The Ninth Circuit opinion concluded with
challenging language directed to the Supreme Court: "[U]ntil the Su-
preme Court directly confronts the 'subtle and complex question' . . .
posed by pendent party jurisdiction . . . we re-affirm Williams and
Hymer. "92
It is interesting to note two other points raised by Ayala. The Ninth
Circuit, citing Hymer, reaffirmed its minority view that pendent party-
plaintiff claims coupled with diversity anchor claims present "inviting
circumstances for the theory's application." 93 The Ninth Circuit view on
this point appears to have been strengthened somewhat by the Supreme
Court's silence on the subject in Aldinger.94
The court also noted that while its position against pendent parties
remains that of a small minority, "the erosion of support for [its] position
. . . has, however, recently been offset by the decision in Fawvor v.
Texaco, Inc. "95 In addition to the fact that this Fifth Circuit case is
subject to a great deal of criticism,96 it is not nearly as apposite to the
Ayala facts as was the case of Florida East Coast Railway v. United
States 97 In Florida East Coast Railway, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction was proper in connection with a
claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
98
Ayala is the latest, and seemingly the most well-tailored attempt to
force the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of pendent party
jurisdiction. It bases its rejection on the single ground that such juris-
diction is beyond the scope of federal power under article III, even when
91. Id. at 1200 n.6.
92. Id. at 1200 (citation and footnote omitted).
93. Id. at 1198 n.4 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d at 1257).
94. This is noteworthy in light of the fact that the Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's
rationale with respect to congressional disinclination. Compare the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in Aldinger, 513 F.2d at 1261, with that of the Supreme Court in the same case, 427
U.S. at 17.
95. 550 F.2d at 1200-01 (citing Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977))
(citations omitted).
96. Fawvor, in fact, involved a plaintiff's attempt to assert a claim against a non-
diverse third party defendant who was already before the court. Since Aldinger distin-
guished pendent party jurisdiction as involving the joinder of a new party, 427 U.S. at 14,
it is difficult to support the Fifth Circuit's contention that Fawvor is expressly based on
the rationale of Aldinger. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d at 641.
97. 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975).
98. Id. at 1194. Note, however, that Florida E.C. Ry., like Fawvor, involved a claim
against a third party defendant, rather than joinder of a new party.
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discretion weighs in favor of joinder. And it presents the article III issue
in the context of a federal question anchor claim over which federal
courts possess exclusive jurisdiction,9 9 a situation which, notwithstand-
ing the Ninth Circuit's view to the contrary, seems to pose the most
persuasive context for the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction.i1° Hav-
ing granted certiorari,101 the Supreme Court may finally be forced to re-
examine the rationale for pendent jurisdiction in the context of pendent
parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted above, the Supreme Court's last and most comprehensive
consideration of pendent jurisdiction under article III was in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs.1°2 As Gibbs implicitly recognized, the Constitution
grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases, not over claims or parties.
103
Gibbs defined the scope of a constitutional "case" as encompassing a
federal claim sufficient to grant subject matter jurisdiction, together with
other claims deriving from a "common nucleus of operative fact" such
that plaintiff(s) would normally be expected to try them all in the same
judicial proceeding." This definition, by itself, places no limitation on
the nature of the parties who may be joined, given a factual nexus
between federal and nonfederal claims.
Still, as both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have repeatedly
pointed out, pendent parties present a special problem. It is not readily
apparent, for example, why an unwilling defendant should be forced into
a federal court on a state cause of action merely because he was involved
in an occurrence which also featured the United States or an out-of-state
defendant. However, given a constitutional grant of jurisdiction over
cases, these considerations would seem more appropriate to the exercise
of judicial discretion or the analysis of legislative intent underlying a
particular jurisdictional statute than as limits upon fundamental federal
power. A Supreme Court opinion in Ayala which recognizes this power
and defines the prerogatives for its use would be of inestimable help in
clearing the air surrounding pendent parties.
Frank S. Osen
99. See Shannon v. United States, 417 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1969) (Serviceman's
Group Life Insurance Act).
100. See note 93 supra and accompanying text; Note, Federal Pendent Party Juris-
diction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA.
L. REV. 194, 203-04 (1976).
101. 98 S. Ct. 50 (1977).
102. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
103. 383 U.S. at 725.
104. Id.
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